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The Durbin Amendment's Interchange Fee and
Network Non-Exclusivity Provisions: Did the Federal
Reserve Board Overstep its Boundaries?
I. INTRODUCTION
Every time a customer makes a debit card purchase with her
debit card, the merchant must pay an interchange feel to the customer's
bank as compensation for its role in the transaction. 2 The Durbin
Amendment (Amendment) to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), introduced regulations for
debit card interchange fees and transactions. 3 The Amendment, which
amended the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) by adding section
920,4 gave the Federal Reserve Board (Board) the task of promulgating
regulations that required the debit interchange fee charged by a card
issuer to be "reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the
issuer with respect to the transaction."5 It also required the Board to
issue regulations prohibiting network exclusivity agreements between
card issuers and networks, and required issuers to ensure that each debit
transaction can be processed on at least two unaffiliated networks. 6
These regulations only apply to card issuers that have assets over $10
billion.7 Those with assets below this marker are considered "exempt
banks."
1. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 920, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(c)(8) (2012) (defining an
interchange fee as "any fee established, charged, or received by a payment card network and
paid by a merchant or acquirer for the purpose of compensating an issuer for its involvement
in an electronic debit transaction"). For a detailed discussion of interchange fee structures,
see infra Part II.C. 1.
2. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,723
(proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), §
1075, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068-2074 (2010).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2.
5. Id. § 1693o-2(a)(2).
6. Id..§ 1693o-2(b)(1). See generally D.C. District Court to Vacate Key Provisions of
Regulation II, ALSTON & BIRD LLP (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.alston.com/advisories/nacsv-board (providing a brief overview of the Durbin Amendment's major provisions).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(a).
8. Id. This Note does not address the provision of the regulation that exempts card
issuers with assets less than $10 billion. However, this Note does discuss how the regulation

628

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 18

The Board's Final Rule (Final Rule) requires that debit
interchange fees not exceed twenty-one cents (plus a small ad valorem
fee) per transaction. 9 The Final Rule also requires that a card issuer or
network not restrict the number of networks on which a debit
transaction may be processed to less than two unaffiliated networks.' 0
Some believe that big banks' lobbying efforts during the rulemaking
process swayed the Board into creating a Final Rule that was not severe
enough to cause changes in the market.1 ' This criticism culminated in a
group of retail trade associations and individual retailers filing suit
against the Board to challenge the Final Rule's interchange fee and
network non-exclusivity regulations.12 U.S. District Court Judge
Richard J. Leon ruled on July 31, 2013, in National Association of
Convenience Stores v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System,13 that the Final Rule concerning these two provisions of the
Amendment was not in accordance with the law under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1 4 The Court vacated these
specific regulations, staying vacatur until further order of the Court, and
remanded to the Board to develop new regulations.' 5
This Note will examine the effect that the Board's improper
interpretation of the interchange fee and network non-exclusivity
provisions of the Amendment has had on banks (both exempt and nonexempt), merchants, and consumers.
By exceeding its statutory
authority, the Board stifled any positive effects that Congress and
Senator Durbin believed would have resulted from the Amendment.
has affected big banks and exempt banks differently. For more information regarding this
provision, see M. Pierce Sandwith, Note, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer ProtectionAct: Debit CardInterchangeFees and the DurbinAmendment's Small
Bank Exemption, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 223 (2012).

9. Regulation II, 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2011) (defining a reasonable and proportional
interchange fee as "no more than the sum of twenty-one cents and five basis points
multiplied by the value of the transaction").
10. 12 C.F.R. § 235.7(a) (stating that "[a]n issuer or payment card network shall not
directly or [indirectly] . . . restrict the number of payment card networks on which an
electronic debit transaction may be processed to less than two unaffiliated networks").
11. Tim Chen, Banks Should Love the Fed's Durbin Amendment Ruling, FORBES (July
12, 2011, 5:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2011/07/12/banks-shouldlove-the-feds-durbin-amendment-ruling/.
12. NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 11-02075 (RJL), 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *3 (D.D.C. July 31, 2013).
13. Throughout this Note, this case is referred to as, "NACS v. Board."
14. NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *87.
15. Id. at *89-92.
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Part II will provide a brief overview of the debit card system and its
fees. 16 Part III will discuss the legislative history of the Amendment
and provide an in-depth discussion of the Board's proposed and final
regulations for the interchange fee and network non-exclusivity
provisions.' 7 Part IV will discuss Judge Leon's analysis in NACS v.
Board, and explore the intended beneficial effects of the Amendment.' 8
Part V will examine the consequences of the Final Rule on big banks,
exempt banks, consumers, small and large merchants, and competition
among debit networks.19 Lastly, Part VI will propose a direction for the
Board's new final rule if Judge Leon's ruling is upheld.20
II. DEBIT CARD SYSTEM AND INTERCHANGE FEES
A.

Emergence ofNoncash Payments and Debit Cards

When debit cards were introduced in the late 1960s and early
1970s, they allowed consumers to directly access the funds in their
deposit accounts from automated teller machines (ATM). 2 1 Debit cards
have since taken on a new life, allowing depositors to make payments to
merchants in stores, online, and even receive cash back at certain
locations.22 Debit cards provide many of the traditional benefits of
checks, but also provide merchants and consumers with ready access to
funds-so that customers can spend more than they might have in their
wallet at the time of sale-increase payment efficiency, and reduce
fraud and nonpayment risks. 23 Because of the mutual benefits to both
consumers and merchants, in recent years debit card use has quickly
outpaced check use. 24
16.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Part VI.
21. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July 20,
2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
22. See id. (providing background on the evolution of the noncash payment industry).
17.

23. See IAN LEE ET AL., MACDONALD-LAURIER INSTITUTE, CREDIT WHERE IT'S DUE:
How PAYMENT CARDS BENEFIT CANADIAN MERCHANTS AND CONSUMERS, AND HOW

REGULATION CAN HARM THEM, 2, 12 (2013).

24. Id. at 12; see Geoffrey R. Gerdes et al., The 2010 Federal Reserve Payments Study,
(Apr.
5,
2011),
Reserve
Sys.
4-5
Fed.
http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/press/2010-payments-study.pdf
(citing other factors that have contributed to the growth in debit cards such as "technological
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The Debit CardSystem

A complex process occurs behind the scenes of every debit card
transaction. 25 There are typically four parties involved in every debit
card transaction: a card-issuing bank, card network, merchant acquiring
bank, and merchant. 26 The card-issuing bank issues a debit card to the
consumer and approves or declines purchases that the consumer
makes. 27 The card network builds and maintains the infrastructure that
links all of the parties of the transaction and sets the fees that merchants,
card issuers, and acquirers pay.28 The merchant acquiring bank
(acquirer) links the merchant to the card network and after approval
from the card issuing bank, credits the merchant's account for the sale.29
During a debit card transaction, an electronic authorization
request is sent from the merchant to the acquirer.30 The request is sent
through a payment network, such as Visa or MasterCard, to the card
issuer.3 1 The card issuer then sends a return message confirming that
the card is active and that there are sufficient funds in the cardholder's

account. 32
An electronic authorization request can be sent over two types

and financial innovations,... the business cycle, changes in the composition of economic
activity, regulatory developments, and population growth").
25. The system described in this paper is the typical four-party system. There is also a
three-party system, which is used for some prepaid card transactions, but is not currently
used for typical debit card transactions. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76
Fed. Reg. at 43,395.
26. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,394-395; see Fumiko
Hayashi, The New Debit Card Regulations: Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, EcON.
REV. OF THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CrrY, at 79, 82 (Fourth Quarter 2012) [hereinafter
Initial Effects on Networks and Banks] (adding an additional party to each transaction: the
consumer).
27. See InitialEffects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 82.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396.
30. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396 ("An electronic
authorization request for a specific dollar amount, along with the cardholder's account
information, is sent from the merchant to the acquirer.").
31. Id.
32. Id. See generally Jason Oxman, Debit Interchange: A Service Worth Paying For,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 10, 2013 (providing an explanation of the debit card transaction
process). There are many networks other than Visa and MasterCard in the market as well.
Visa, MasterCard and Discover own the only three signature debit networks in the market.
However, there are approximately one dozen PIN debit networks, including three owned by
the three signature networks-Interlink, Maestro, and Pulse. Initial Effects on Networks and
Banks, supra note 26, at 82.
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of networks: personal identification number (PIN) networks and
signature networks. 33 Currently, about 60% of debit card transactions
are sent over signature networks, while 40% are sent over PIN
networks. 34 Many of the leading networks in the industry own both a
signature and PIN network. 5 PIN networks usually require a PIN from
the consumer at the time of the transaction and send authorization and
clearance information in one message from the card issuer to the
36
merchant acquirer.36
Conversely, signature networks, which are
leveraged on the credit card infrastructure, send two messages from the
cardholder's bank: one that contains the authorization information and
another that contains the clearing information.3 7 While PIN transactions
instantaneously debit the purchase amount from the cardholder's
account, signature transactions typically take two to three days to
process and then debit money from the cardholder's account.3 8 The
network over which a transaction is sent depends on a variety of factors
such as the transaction type, merchant policy, and features on the
consumer's card.39 Most cards support either type of network; however,
some transactions, such as hotel reservations, rentals, Internet, and
telephone purchases, do not support PIN transactions because the
amount due is not known at the time of the purchase.4 0

33. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,395.
34. InitialEffects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 82.
35. See Fumiko Hayashi, The New Debit Card Regulations: Effects on Merchants,
Consumers, and Payments System Efficiency, Economic Review of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, at 90, 92 n.2 (First Quarter 2012) [hereinafter Effects on Merchants,
Consumers, and Payment System Efficiency].
36. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,395.
37. Id.; Arnold S. Rosenberg, Better than Cash? Global Proliferation of Payment
Cardsand Consumer ProtectionPolicy, 44 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L. L. 520, 528 (2006).
38. Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 528.
39. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,395.
40. Id.
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Debit and Credit CardFees41

In comparison to a purchase made by check, for which the
merchant receives the full face value, when a consumer pays with her
debit card, the merchant receives less than the full purchase amount.42
This is due to the merchant discount fee, which the acquirer charges the
merchant.
This fee is made up of smaller fees, including the
interchange, network, and processing fees. 43 The merchant discount is
implicitly dictated by networks because networks establish an
interchange fee structure, which is applied to every card-issuing bank in
its network.4 The card issuer then charges the appropriate rate in the
interchange rate structure to the acquirer.4 5 To recoup the interchange
fee, the acquirer charges a merchant discount to the merchant to cover
this and other fees.46 Because of these fees, a merchant typically

41. For an example of debit card fees for a transaction, see In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 72 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), af'd, 280
F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2001) ("Bank A issues a Visa credit card to Consumer X, who purchases
a garment for $100 at Store Y, which was 'acquired' for Visa by Bank B. Visa rules
mandate that Bank B must pay Bank A an interchange fee of 1.25% of the amount of the
transaction, i.e., $1.25. Bank B will charge Store Y a "discount fee" higher than $1.25 in
order to recover the mandated interchange fee and other fees that Visa rules mandate Bank
B to pay Visa on each and every Visa credit card (and debit card) transaction and to earn a
profit for itself. Thus, Bank B may charge a discount fee of 1.6% of the transaction amount
(or $1.60) to Store Y. When Store Y presents Consumer X's $100 Visa transaction to Bank
B, the bank will credit Store Y's account for $98.40, send the Visa mandated $1.25
interchange fee to Bank A and retain $.35 of the 'discount fee."').
42. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,398 (stating that
a payor's bank in a check system does not recoup the costs it incurs, thus resulting in
clearance at par).
43. Id. at 43,396 ("The acquirer charges the merchant a merchant discount-the
difference between the face value of a transaction and the amount the acquirer transfers to
the merchant-that includes the interchange fee, network ... fees charged to the acquirer,
other acquirer costs, and an acquirer markup."); Initial Effects on Networks and Banks,
supra note 26, at 85 ("[T]he network fee goes to the network that processes the transaction
and . . . [the] processing fee goes to the merchant acquirer.").

44. See Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 85-86; Comment
Letter of Senator Richard J. Durbin to Federal Reserve Board 5 (Feb. 22, 2011), availableat
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/April/20110405/R1404/R1404_022211_67820_571445654740_1.pdf (presenting a downside to the practice of
having one rate structure for each card issuer in the network: that "each bank that issues the
network's cards receives exactly the same network-established fee no matter how efficiently
or inefficiently that bank processes transactions or prevents fraud").
45. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396; see About
Interchange,

ELECTRONIC

PAYMENTS

COALITION

(last

visited

Feb.

http://www.electronicpaymentscoalition.org/what-is-interchange/.
46. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396.
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2014),

2014]

DURBINAMENDMENT

633

receives approximately 98% of the face value of the transaction.4 7
1. Interchange Fees
Of the many fees associated with debit card transactions, the
most lucrative for card issuers is the interchange fee.4 8 An interchange
fee is statutorily defined as "any fee established, charged, or received by
a payment card network and paid by a merchant or acquirer for the
purpose of compensating an issuer for its involvement in an electronic
debit transaction." 49 Interchange fee structures are complex, while rates
in the structure can vary depending on merchant type and size, and can
be either fixed or proportional to the transaction value.5 0 Before the
Amendment, networks were incentivized to increase interchange fees
continually to attract card issuers to their network because higher fees
meant more revenue for the bank.5 ' The network also benefited from an
increase in card issuers in its network because the more cards issued, the
more network fees it could collect. 52
While each network creates its own interchange fee structure,
fees vary depending on whether the transaction is over a signature or
PIN network.
Before the Amendment, interchange fees averaged
twenty-three cents per transaction for PIN transactions and fifty-six
cents per transaction for signature transactions. 54 As a result of this
difference, many stores, such as Wal-Mart and Home Depot, began
steering customers toward using PIN, while other stores, such as
Costco, do not even allow customers to sign for their debit purchases. 55
47. Richard A. Epstein, Durbin's Folly: The Erratic Course of Debit CardMarkets, 7
COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 58, 61 (Autumn 2011).
48. See Comment Letter of Senator Richard J. Durbin to Federal Reserve Board, supra
note 44, at 5.
49. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 920, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(c)(8) (2012).
50. Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 86.
51. Comment Letter of Senator Richard J. Durbin to Federal Reserve Board, supra
note 44, at 5.
52. See id.
53. For an explanation of the differences between PIN and signature networks, see
supra Part II.B.
54. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,397 (July 20,
2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235) ("The average debit interchange fee for signature debit
transactions was .. . 1.53% of the average transaction amount ... [and t]he average
interchange fee for PIN debit transactions was ... .58% of the average transaction
amount.").
55. Andrew Martin, How Visa, Using Card Fees, Dominates a Market, N.Y. TIMES
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Interchange fees vary widely depending on the authentication method
because signature transactions are leveraged on the credit card system,
and therefore have interchange fees similar to those for credit card
transactions. 6 Furthermore, PIN fees are lower because the risk of
nonpayment is virtually nonexistent. Both transaction methods' fees
continually increased in the years before the Amendment, with PIN
debit fees growing at a faster rate.5 8
2. Merchant Discount
In order to use the acquirer's card acceptance services,
merchants must pay a merchant discount fee to their acquirer.59 A
portion of this fee compensates the acquirer for its services, while other
portions go to the debit network in the form a network fee and, as
previously noted, to the card issuer to cover the interchange fee. 60
Merchant discount fees come in two forms: interchange-plus and
blended. 6 ' The largest merchants tend to pay an interchange-plus
merchant discount, which allows them to pay the exact price for each
portion of the merchant discount. 62 Smaller merchants tend to pay a
flat-rate blended fee, irrespective of the exact price of each portion of
the merchant discount.63 Merchants with an interchange-plus discount
will never pay more than the exact interchange fee for each transaction,
(Jan.
5,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/your-money/credit-and-debitcards/05visa.html?pagewanted=all&r- I &.
56. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396.
57. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 131 (2nd Cir. 2001).
58. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396.
59. See About Interchange, supra note 45; Initial Effects on Networks and Banks,
supra note 26, at 85 (stating that the processing fee, a component of the merchant discount,
goes directly to the merchant acquirer).
60. Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 85.
61. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396 n.17.
62. See Effects on Merchants, Consumers, and Payment System Efficiency, supra note
35, at 97; David S. Evans et al., Economic Analysis of Claims in Support of the "Durbin
Amendment" to Regulate Debit Card Interchange Fees 2 n.5 (Visa, Inc., Working Paper
1843628, May 16, 2011), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract-1843628; see also
Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396 n.17.
63. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396 n.17; Effects on
Merchants, Consumers, and Payment System Efficiency, supra note 35, at 97. Another
explanation for large merchants receiving the interchange-plus fee and smaller merchants
receiving the blended fee is that the blended fee allows smaller merchants to simplify their
budgeting for debit card transactions while the varying interchange-plus fee would be too
burdensome on their budgeting. See id.
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while those with a blended discount could end up paying more than the
transaction's applicable interchange fee, because each portion of the
discount is not itemized."
Merchants are able to negotiate with
acquirers for which merchant discount they are charged, making
bargaining power in the negotiation process critical.65 Those merchants
with a high volume of sales, and therefore more fee-generating
transactions, can negotiate to receive the interchange-plus discount
since the acquirer does not want to risk the large merchant walking
away. 66
III. THE DURBIN AMENDMENT

A.

Legislative History

As debit card use rapidly increased in the United States, some
networks and card issuers entered into exclusivity agreements, "wherein
the banks restricted transactions on their debit cards to a single signature
network and a single PIN network, which were both owned by the same
company." 67 Senator Richard Durbin pushed for inclusion of the
Amendment in the Dodd-Frank Act because these exclusivity
agreements were decreasing network competition and creating
unreasonably high interchange fees.6 8 Senator Durbin wanted to place
64. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396 n.17; Effects on
Merchants, Consumers, andPayment System Efficiency, supra note 35, at 97.
65. See David S. Evans et al., supra note 62, at 2 n.5 (stating that the merchant acquirer
determines the merchant discount fee it will charge a merchant, which signals that there is
likely a negotiation process between the two parties).
66. See Scott A. Shay, DurbinAmendment: The Debit CardDebacle and the Triumph
of Mega Retailers, N.Y.
OBSERVER
(Sept.
12,
2013,
12:42
PM),
http://observer.com/2013/09/durbin-amendment-the-debit-card-debacle-and-the-triumph-ofthe-mega-retailers/ (arguing that the Amendment could have pushed for small businesses "to
receive the same prices negotiated and paid by the mega retailers"); Anisha Sekar, The
Durbin
Amendment
Explained,
NERDWALLET.COM,
http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/banking/durbin-amendment-explained/ (last updated Sept.
26, 2012) ("Gas stations, small restaurants and small business owners pay the highest fees,
while big box retailers like Wal-Mart and Safeway are able to negotiate lower prices.").
67. Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 88. See generally Jim
Daly, Rewriting the Transaction Routing System, DIGITALTRANSACTIONS.NET (Jan. 1, 2011),
http://www.digitaltransactions.net/news/story/2864 (providing an example of the lucrative
nature of exclusivity agreements: "79% of Visa's debit volume from its top ten issuers
comes through issuers with whom Visa has exclusive network arrangements").
68. See Comment Letter of Richard J. Durbin to Federal Reserve Board, supra note 44,
at 5; Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 88. But see id. at 79 (stating
that opponents to the Amendment argued that "the debit card was already marked by intense
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reasonable constraints on debit interchange price-setting and ensure
market competition by preventing the ongoing consolidation of the
dominant networks' market power.6 9 More precisely, the Amendment
had four objectives: (1) helping small, struggling businesses; (2) passing
savings on to customers; (3) increasing transparency and competition in
the debit interchange fee market; and (4) regulating fees to mirror those
throughout the rest of the world.7 0 To accomplish these goals, the
Amendment requires that "the amount of any interchange fee that an
issuer may receive or charge . . . be reasonable and proportional to the

cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction." 7 It also
prohibits card issuers and networks from restricting the number of
payment networks for a transaction to one network or two or more
networks that are "owned, controlled, or otherwise operated by
affiliated persons or networks affiliated with such issuer." 72
1. Help Small, Struggling Businesses
One of the main objectives of the Amendment was to help small
businesses grow, which ideally would help rejuvenate the U.S.
economy. 7 Many small business owners pushed for this Amendment,
offering testimony that increasing interchange fees had eaten away at
their profits and left them at the mercy of networks, since merchants
must accept debit cards, or risk losing business.7 4 Following the 2008
financial crisis, Congress placed importance on helping these small
businesses grow, so that they could hire more workers and increase
competition, aimed not at winning merchants to a given card network but at attracting
customers to a given bank's debit cards").
69. Comment Letter of Richard J. Durbin to Federal Reserve Board, supra note 44, at
5, 11.
70. See Press Release, Senator Richard J. Durbin, Durbin Statement on His Debit Card
Swipe Fee Amendment (May 13, 2010) [hereinafter Durbin Statement on His Debit Card
at
available
Fee
Amendment],
Swipe
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=506e66c9-13bd-455cba2l-d749148b5d5e; see also Press Release, Senator Richard J. Durbin, Statement by
Richard J. Durbin on Swipe Fee Reform (Mar. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Statement by Richard
at
Fee
Reform],
available
Durbin
on
Swipe
J.
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfn/statementscommentary?ID=4cc823e7-c23244f2-bfcO-b80b3 1e2561 a.
71. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 920, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2012).
72. Id. § 1693o-2(b)(1)(A).
73. Durbin Statement on His Debit Card Swipe Fee Amendment, supra note 70.
74. Statement by Richard J. Durbin on Swipe Fee Reform, supra note 70.
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sales and profits. In a perfect world, these businesses' ability to hire
more workers would reduce unemployment,7 6 while greater profit
margins would inject capital into the market and spur spending-all of
which would help a struggling economy. The Amendment also focused
on helping small businesses because they did not have the same
bargaining power to negotiate for favorable merchant discounts as
The Amendment's provision that mandated
larger retailers."
interchange fee regulation was intended to level the playing field for
these small businesses. 78
2. Passing Savings to Consumers
Businesses were supposed to pass through savings realized
through debit interchange fee regulation on to consumers through lower
When setting prices, merchants generally factor the
prices.79
interchange fee into the sticker price because they do not know in
advance whether the customer will choose to pay by cash, check, or
card.80 Because of these markups, it is estimated the average American
family pays an extra $427 per year for their regular goods and
services.8 1 The Amendment was supposed to be a method for
consumers to realize these savings, keep more of their own money, and
for merchants to offer discounts to their customers. 82
75. Id. For further illustration of the U.S. government's efforts to help small businesses
following the 2008 financial crisis, see Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2012) (citing
the policy goals of the Act as aiding, counseling, and assisting with small business concerns,
providing assistance to compete in international markets, the use of assistance programs to
establish, preserve, and strengthen small business concerns, etc.).
76. See generally UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000
(citing the United States's unemployment level as 9.5% when the Amendment was passed in
July 2010, which was only .5% lower than the highest level since 2003).
77. For an explanation about bargaining power in the relationship between merchants
and merchant acquirers, see supra Part II.C.2.
78. See Durbin Statement on His Debit Card Swipe Fee Amendment, supra note 70
(stating that the Amendment gives small business a chance to fight against the high
interchange fees that they are charged).
79. See id.
80. See Sekar, supra note 66.
81. Press Release, Senator Richard J. Durbin, Durbin Chairs Hearing on the Payment
of Interchange Fees by the Federal Government, (June 16, 2010), available at
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfn/pressreleases?ID=bf2e545a-27d0-4b8c-

9788-7445a91830ae.
82.

See Durbin Statement on His Debit Card Swipe Fee Amendment, supra note 70.
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Interchange fee regulation would also save the federal
government money, since it must pay interchange fees on purchases at
federal entities for things like: park admissions and camping fees at the
National Park Service; student loan fees at the Department of
Education; and insurance copayments from veterans at Veterans'
Affairs hospitals. 83 For example, in 2009 the City of Chicago and the
Illinois Tollway paid $7.5 million and $11.6 million, respectively, in
interchange fees to card issuers and networks.84 The mechanism for
paying debit interchange fees is different for government entities than
for commercial merchants. 85 The Treasury pays the card fees for all
federal government agencies out of its general fund, so any reduction in
card costs would go directly to reducing the Federal deficit.8 6 It was
estimated that this regulation would save taxpayers approximately $36
to $39 million per year from reduced interchange fees at these
government entities. 87
3. Increase Transparency and Competition
The Amendment was also viewed as a way to stop Visa and
MasterCard from holding "all of the cards" in the payment system
industry. The interchange fee market is uncompetitive and two-sided,
meaning that because there is an interdependent demand between
83. See Oversight of Federal Payment of Interchange Fees: How to Save Taxpayer
Dollars: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Serv. and Gen. Gov't of the H. Comm. on
Appropriation, 111th Cong. 5-6 (2010) [hereinafter Oversight of Federal Payment]
(Statement of Gary Grippo, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fiscal Operations and Policy,
Department of Treasury) ("In fiscal year 2009, the Treasury spent $116 million on
interchange and card fees.").
84. Letter from Sen. Richard J. Durbin to Camden Fine, President and CEO of Indep.
Cmty. Bankers of Am. and Dan Mica, President and CEO of Credit Union Nat'l Ass'n (June
11, 2010), availableat
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?id=d9c42bd5-b945-4beeb025-55aab2fd586a.
85. See Oversight ofFederalPayment, supra note 83, at 8 (Prepared Statement of Gary
Grippo, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fiscal Operations and Policy, Department of
Treasury) ("[I]f a merchant is charged card fees of 2%, a sales transaction of $100 would
result in a deposit of $98 to the merchant when the card transaction settles, with $2 withheld
to cover the fees. When a Federal agency accepts a card payment for a $100 transaction with
a 2% card fee, however the agency will receive a deposit at par of $100 and the Treasury
will be separately billed for a $2 fee.").
86. See id.
87. Oversight of FederalPayment, supra note 83, at 3 (Opening Statement of Senator
Richard J. Durbin, Chairman).
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consumers and merchants for particular cards, the typical supply-anddemand principles that force prices to stay competitive are absent.88
Furthermore, the competition that does exist in this market involves
networks attempting to attract the banks that issue cards, rather than the
consumers and merchants who use them daily. 89 Through the
Amendment, Senator Durbin wanted to increase transparency and
competition in the market and break up the Visa/MasterCard duopoly,
which at the time represented 80% of the market share in the debit
processing network industry. 90 These companies' dominance over the
market was seen as problematic because they unilaterally set
interchange fee rates that applied to all banks within their network,
without any oversight to ensure that they did not fix these fees at
unreasonable levels.91
The credit card industry received similar criticisms over
networks' interchange fee practices for credit card transactions. For
example, a 2010 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation, in
connection with its antitrust settlement with Visa and MasterCard,
found that the companies' credit card rules concerning interchange fees
were anticompetitive and unfair to consumers and merchants. 92
Additionally, merchants filed more than fifty lawsuits against credit
card networks and their issuers challenging their interchange fee
88. See Lisa Farrell, Note & Comment, A Step in the Right Direction: Regulation of
Debit Card InterchangeFees in the Durbin Amendment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1077,
1087-88 (2011) (explaining that a two-sided market "exists when a product's value is
realized only when two seemingly distinct customers both agree to use the product....
interdependent demand is present . .. [because] consumers will not carry particular cards if
merchants do not accept them and merchants will not accept cards if not enough consumers
carry them."). See generally IAN LEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 11 (examining pricing
methods in two-sided markets).
89. Durbin Statement on His Debit Card Swipe Fee Amendment, supra note 70. See
generally Martin, supra note 55 (discussing Visa's dominance over the payment system
market).
90. See Durbin Statement on His Debit Card Swipe Fee Amendment, supranote 70.
91. See id.; see also Sekar, supra note 66 (claiming that merchants cannot realistically
choose not to accept these networks because it would deter business, meaning the networks
have enormous power).
92. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Sues American
Express, MasterCard and Visa to Eliminate Rules Restricting Price Competition; Reaches
2010),
(October
4,
MasterCard
Visa
and
with
Settlement
R.
Johnson,
Andrew
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/October/10-at-l I 15.html;
Merchants Square Off with Visa, MasterCardover Swipe-Fee Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
12, 2013, 10:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/09/12/merchants-square-offwith-visa-mastercard-over-swipe-fee-settlement/ (asserting that this settlement will be billed
as the largest settlement of an anti-trust case in U.S. history).
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practices during the 2000s. 93 Criticisms of the similarly structured
credit card system only furthered support for the regulation of debit card

networks. 94
4. Aligning Interchange Fees with the International Norm
The final, often overlooked, rationale for debit interchange fee
regulation was to bring the United States's fee system into conformity
with the emerging international norm. 95 Before the Amendment, debit
interchange fees averaged approximately 1.14% of the transaction
amount in the United States, while they averaged only 0.2% of the
transaction amount in the European Union. 96 Further, the United States
had the highest interchange fees in the world while many other
countries were working with Visa and MasterCard to lower their fees.9 7
As early as the 1990s and early 2000s, many countries required
interchange fees to be set according to cost-based benchmarks, or even
made interchange fees illegal. 98 It is argued that regulation in at least
one country, Australia, resulted in an increased number of transactions,
a growth in new debit accounts, and a decrease in cardholder fees. 99
93. See Terri Bradford & Fumiko Hayashi, Developments in Interchange Fees in the
United States and Abroad, PAYMENTS Sys. RESEARCH BRIEFING (Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, Mo.), Apr. 2008, at 2-4.
94. See Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 88 (stating that the
antitrust settlement cited one of the same goals of the Durbin Amendment--creating more
competition among debit card networks for merchants).
95. 156 CONG. REc. S10997 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard J.
Durbin); see Durbin Statement on His Debit Card Swipe Fee Amendment, supra note 70.
For more information on international trends in interchange fee regulation, see Bradord &
Hayashi, supra note 93; David A. Balto & Ryan W. Marth, InternationalDevelopments on
Payment Systems and InterchangeFees, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 121 (2007); Gregory
M. Duhl, InternationalDevelopments in Consumer FinancialServices Law 2007-2008, 64
Bus. LAW. 677, 679-81 (2009).
96. Press Release, Senator Richard J. Durbin, Durbin, Local Business Owners Call for
Prompt Federal Reserve Action on Swipe Fee Regulations (June 10, 2011), available at
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfin/pressreleases?ID=3103 1ccd-2dc6-4045886f-b7b5bO2cle26.
97. Durbin Statement on His Debit Card Swipe Fee Amendment, supra note 70 ("Visa
lowered many European debit rates by 60% while increasing many U.S. debit rates by
30%.").
98. See Bradford & Hayashi, supra note 93, at 2-4 (Canada and Norway impose no
interchange fees for debit transactions, Australia and Denmark had required standards and
eleven other countries and the European Union had either implemented or proposed credit
and debit network regulations).
99. See David Balto, New Ruling on Swipe Fee Cap; Same Tired Arguments from
Bankers, AM. BANKER, Aug. 16, 2013 (citing the positive effects of interchange fee
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The abundance of countries with proposed or implemented interchange
rules reflected the global trend toward fee regulation, with the United
States noticeably lagging behind.
B.

InterchangeFee Provision in the Durbin Amendment

The Amendment requires that "the amount of any interchange
transaction fee that an issuer may receive or charge with respect to an
electronic debit transaction be reasonableand proportionalto the cost
incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction." 00 Congress
instructed the Board to implement the statute through regulation.o'0 The
statute states that when creating the rule and deciding on a reasonable
and proportional interchange fee, the Board was to distinguish between
the incremental costs in the authorization, clearance, or settlement
("ACS") of a particulartransaction, and those costs that are not specific
to a particular transaction. 10 2 Those costs that were incremental to the
ACS of a particular transaction were to be considered when making the
fee standard, while non-incremental costs to a particular transaction
were not.103 In determining which costs to the issuer are incremental to
ACS of a particular transaction, the Board requested public comment on
a proposed rule for implementing the interchange fee provision of the

Amendment. 104
The Board initially proposed an interchange fee regulation on
December 28, 2010, providing two alternatives: (1) each card issuer
could recover its actual incremental ACS costs up to twelve cents per
transaction if the card issuer chose to determine its individual allowable
costs, and up to a cap of seven cents if it chose not to (seven-cent cap),
or (2) a flat cap of twelve cents per transaction (twelve-cent cap). 105 In

regulation in Australia).
100. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 920, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis
added).
101. Id. § 1693o-2(a)(1).
102. Id. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,722
(proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235) (providing all topics on which the
Board requested comment from the public).
105. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,726 (referring to
these proposals as "Alternative I" and "Alternative 2," respectively, during the rulemaking
process).
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response to the proposed rule, the Board received more than 11,500
comments from card issuers, payment card networks, merchants,
consumers, and other interested parties.1 06 Generally, merchants
supported the seven-cent cap, claiming that it would bring fees in line
with those in a competitive, free market.107 They also claimed that the
twelve-cent cap would be too high, based on most card issuers' current
actual ACS costs.' 08 Card issuers and networks, on the other hand,
supported the twelve-cent cap but also suggested expanding the
allowable costs to include payment guarantee costs, fraud losses,
network processing fees, customer service costs, costs of rewards, and
some fixed costs. 109

After analyzing the comments, the Board published its Final
Rule on July 20, 2011, which became effective October 1, 2011.10 The
Final Rule implemented a modified version of the proposed twelve-cent
cap: a fixed cap of twenty-one cents and an ad valorem component of
.05% of the transaction's value, plus another penny for issuers that
complied with specified fraud prevention measures."' The Board
determined the value for the fixed cap based on the per-transaction
allowable costs of card issuers at the eightieth percentile.1 1 2 The Final
Rule also expanded the category of allowable costs that were deemed
related to the ACS of a particular transaction, which were therefore
factored into the interchange fee cap." 3 The ad valorem component of
the Board's final interchange fee standard was also added to account for

106. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,394 (July 20,
2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
107. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,402.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,394.
111. Regulation II, 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b); see Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing,
76 Fed. Reg. at 43,434-35. See generally Consumer Financial Services Group, The Durbin
Two Shoes Drop, BALLARD SPAHR LLP 1 (July 7, 2011),
Amendment http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2011-07
07_thedurbinamendmenttwo.shoes-drop.aspx (providing an explanation of the Final
Rule).
112. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,422.
113. See id. at 43,404 ("The Board chose to consider network connectivity, software,
hardware, equipment, associated labor, networking processing fees, transaction monitoring
as incremental, while excluding costs associated with corporate overhead, establishing
account relationships, card production and delivery, marketing, research and development,
reward programs, customer inquiries, and network membership fees); Id. at 43,426-31
(providing an in-depth discussion on the included and excluded costs).
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the average per-transaction fraud loss of the median card issuer.1 4 The
Final Rule has been criticized for seemingly bending to the card issuers'
and banks' lobbying efforts and favoring these parties more than
Congress intended.'" 5
C.

Network Non-Exclusivity Provisionin the Durbin Amendment

The other key provision of the Amendment requires that an
issuer or payment card network not "restrict the number of payment
card networks on which an electronic debit transaction may be
processed to one network, or two or more networks which are owned,
controlled, or otherwise operated by affiliated persons or networks
affiliated with that issuer."ll 6 In formulating its rule, the Board initially
proposed a choice between two alternatives: (A) an issuer or network
could not restrict the number of networks over which an electronic debit
transaction could be processed to fewer than two unaffiliated networks
(network proposal); or (B) an issuer or network could not restrict the
number of payment card networks over which a transaction could be
processed to fewer than two unaffiliated networks for each method of
authentication(authentication method proposal)." 7
Merchants' comments generally supported the authentication
They argued this alternative would create
method proposal.' 18
competition within both PIN and signature transactions, which would
result in lower transaction fees, better services, and lower prices for
goods and services for consumers.11 9 Conversely, card issuers and
114. Id. at 43,422.
115. See Chen, supra note 11; Press Release, Senator Richard J. Durbin, Durbin
Statement on the Final Federal Reserve Rule on Interchange Fees (June 29, 2011), available
at http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=5a235d89-5db7-4ba8aca8-c34cb93136f7 [hereinafter Durbin Statement on Final Rule]; Sekar, supranote 66 (The
"Durbin Amendment is generally seen as more favorable to the financial industry than
expected.").
116. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 920, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(1)(A) (2012).
117. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,726-27
(proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (emphasis added) ("Under [Alternative A], it would be sufficient
for an issuer to issue a debit card that could be processed over one signature-based network
and one PIN-based network, provided the networks are not affiliated... . Under [Alternative
B], an issuer that used both signature- and PIN-based authentication would have to enable
its debit cards with two unaffiliated signature-based networks and two unaffiliated PINbased networks.").
118. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,447.
119. Id.
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networks supported the network proposal because it would be less
disruptive to the existing payment system, as many institutions were
already in compliance with that alternative. 120 These parties further
contended that the authentication method proposal would be too costly
and burdensome to implement. 1 2 1 After considering all comments, the
Board adopted the network proposal, believing it to be the most
consistent with the statutory language.122 Additionally, the Board
agreed with the card issuers and networks that the burdens of the
authentication method proposal outweighed any benefits to
consumers.1 23
IV. CHALLENGE TO THE FINAL RULE -NACS

V.BOARD OF GOVERNORS

When the Board announced its Final Rule on June 29, 2011,
which was to be published on July 20, 201 1,124 Senator Durbin released
a statement saying that he was disappointed that the Board had
succumbed to big banks' pressure during the rulemaking process.125
Senator Durbin was not the only person upset with the Board's Final
Rule; on November 22, 2011, four major trade associations and two
individual retailers brought suit against the Board claiming that it
implemented a rule inconsistent with the statute.1 26 In that case, NACS
v. Board, the Court held that the Board's Final Rule regarding the
interchange fees and the network non-exclusivity provisions exceeded
the Board's statutory authority. 127
While reviewing the Board's regulations under the APA, the
D.C. District Court applied the two-step analysis developed in Chevron

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. (The Board believed that "the plain language of the statute does not require
that there be two unaffiliated payment card networks available to the merchant for each
method of authentication. In other words, the statute does not expressly require issuers to
offer multiple unaffiliated signature and multiple unaffiliated PIN debit card network
choices on each card.").
123. See id. at 43,448.
124. Press Release, Federal Reserve Board (June 29, 2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20110629a.htm.
125. Durbin Statement on Final Rule, supra note 115.
126. See NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 11-02075 (RJL),
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *3-4, *30 (D.D.C. July 31, 2013).
127. Id. at *2.
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U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.128 to determine whether the Board exceeded
its statutory scope in its rulemaking.129 Under the first step of the
analysis, the Court must decide if the statutory language, coupled with
the legislative history, clearly showed Congress's intent with respect to
"the precise question at issue."o3 0
If the statutory language is
unambiguous, then the Board has no power to create rules that go
beyond Congress's expressed intent.131
However, if the Court
determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the specific issue,
the Board is entitled to clarify any ambiguities through its rulemaking
and the Court only invalidates the rule if it were found to be an
impermissible construction of the statute.' 32 Under this analysis, Judge
Leon determined that the statutory text and Congressional intent
regarding the interchange fee and network non-exclusivity provisions
were clear, and thus the Board exceeded the scope of its authority in its
rulemaking. 133
A.

The Board'sInterchangeFee Standardis Impermissible

The District Court held that the Board's Final Rule included
allowable costs in its interchange fee standard that Congress did not
intend to include, which inflated the interchange fee standard to a level
much higher than should have been allowed.134 The statute states that
128. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
129. See NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *34.
130. Id. at *35 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
131. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843). See generally D.C. District Court to
Vacate Key Provisions of Regulation II, supra note 6 (explaining the Court's standard of
review and method of analysis).
132. See NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *35 ("An agency's construction is
permissible 'unless it is arbitrary or capricious in substance or manifestly contrary to the
statute."' (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
704, 711 (2011)).
133. Id. at *45, *82. The Supreme Court developed the Chevron doctrine to allow
deference to agencies' actions; therefore for this Court to strike down the Board's action
under the first step of the analysis shows that the Court felt the agency was overreaching
drastically in its rulemaking. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
134. See NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *64 ("And it is quite clear that the
statute did not allow the Board to consider the additional costs factored into the interchange
fee standard."). This is further evidenced by an examination of the Board's proposed rules.
The Board initially proposed a $.07 cap but later implemented a standard over three times
that amount. This discrepancy could be used to show that the Board interpreted the statute
one way and succumbed to lobbying pressures. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and
Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,401-03 (July 20, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
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the Board is to
distinguish between the incremental costs incurred by an
issuer for the role of the issuer in the authorization,
clearance, or settlement of a particular electronic debit
transaction, which cost shall be considered; and other
costs incurred by an issuer which are not specific to a
particular electronic debit transaction, which costs shall
not be considered
when formulating the interchange fee regulation.135 The Court
concluded that based on the language "distinguish between,"' 36
Congress intended to bifurcate electronic debit transaction costs into
two categories: permissible and impermissible.' 37 Congress's word
choice of "other costs"' 38 also indicated that these two categories were
to be mutually exclusive and all encompassing of every cost in the
system.139 Second, the term "incremental" 40 limited the allowable
costs to "variable, as opposed to fixed," costs in the ACS of a
transaction. 14 1 Finally, the term "particular" 42 directed the Board to
omit costs that were not unique to a distinct transaction.1 43 Therefore,
only costs that were distinct and variable to the ACS of a particular
transaction are to be factored into the Board's interchange fee standard,
while all fixed and other costs are to be ignored.144
The Final Rule, however, did not follow these statutory
mandates.145 The Board included a third category of costs in its
interchange fee regulation by factoring in costs that were determined to
be specific to a particular transaction, but not incremental to the card

135. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 920, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(B) (2012)
(emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. See NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *44.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(B)(ii).
139. See NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *46.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(B)(i).
141. Id. at *51 (quoting Me. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 964 F.2d 5, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(B)(ii).
143. See id. at *51-52.
144. See id. at *44-52.
145. See id. at *59.
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issuer's role in ACS.14 6 The Board improperly narrowed the category
of excluded costs to those costs "not incurred in the course of effecting
any electronic debit transaction," 1 47 which expanded the range of
allowable costs to "any cost that is incurred in the course of effecting an
electronic debit transaction."l 48 This resulted in the Board factoring
into the interchange fee standard costs that Congress did not envision,
such as fixed ACS costs, transaction monitoring costs, an allowance for
fraud losses, and network processing fees. 149
Legislative history also indicates that Congress intended to
bifurcate debit transaction costs into two mutually exclusive
categories.' 5 0 Congress passed the Amendment to require reasonable
and proportional interchange fee regulations, which would reduce fees
for consumers and merchants.' 5 ' Congress did not intend for issuers to
be able to recoup interchange fees at the level set by the Final Rule
because an interchange fee standard set this high would not incentivize
competition and innovation of efficient, cost-saving solutions among
issuers, as the majority of issuers would be able to recoup all, if not
more, of their total operating cost.152 Despite the Board showing its
understanding of Congress's intent in its proposed rule which had much
lower caps of seven and twelve-cents,' 5 3 the Final Rule merely split the

146. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,426 (July 20,
2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235); see NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *59.
147. See NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *61 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1693o2(a)(4)(B)(ii) (emphasis added)).
148. See id. at *61-62 (quoting Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg.
43,426).
149. See id. at *66.
150. See 156 CONG. REc. S5925 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard J.
Durbin) ("Paragraph (a)(4) makes clear that the cost to be considered by the Board in ...
[its] analysis is the incremental cost incurred by the issuer for its role in the ACS of a
particular electronic debit transaction, as opposed to other costs which are not specific to the
ACS of a particular electronic debit transaction.").
151. See 156 CONG. REc. S5925 (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin); supra Part
III.A.2 (discussing the goals of the Durbin Amendment).
152. See Brief of Senator Richard J. Durbin as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment at 25, NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581 (D.D.C. July 31, 2013) (No. 1:11-cv-02075) ("Congress'[s]
goals were to enhance competition, transparency and choice in the debit system and squeeze
out inefficiencies by reducing . . . rates . . . thereby compelling large issuers to compete

against each other to manage their other costs more efficiently."); Debit Card Interchange
Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,422 (stating that the interchange fee standard was at
the eightieth percentile of reported interchange costs to card issuers).
153. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,737
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difference between merchant and card issuers' desires following the

comment period.154
B.

The Board's Network Non-Exclusivity ProvisionExceeds
Statutory Scope

The District Court also held that the Board exceeded its scope of
permissible agency action when it implemented a network nonexclusivity provision that did not follow Congress's express intent.' 5 5
The statute provides:
an issuer or payment card network shall not ... restrict
the number of payment card networks on which an
electronic debit transaction may be processed to one
such network or two or more such networks which are
owned, controlled, or otherwise operated by affiliated
persons, or networks affiliated with such issuer.' 56
The statutory language further "instructs the Board to ensure
that issuers and networks [cannot] restrict[] merchants' ability to route
each transaction over different networks."' 5 7 After reading the statutory
definitions of "electronic debit transaction"' 58 and "debit card"l 59 into
the network non-exclusivity provision, the Court held that Congress
expressly "intended for each transaction to be routed over at least two
competing networks for each authorization method." 60
Legislative history also indicates that Congress intended the
(proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235) ("The Board believes that setting
the cap at 12 cents per transaction will be sufficient to allow all but the highest-cost
issuers ...
to recover through interchange transaction fees the costs incurred for
authorizing, clearing, and settling electronic debit transactions.").
154. Brief of Senator Richard J. Durbin as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 152, at 24.
155. See NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *81.
156. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 920, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(1)(A) (2012)
(emphasis added).
157. NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *76.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(c)(5) ("The term 'electronic debit transaction' means a
transaction in which a person uses a debit card.").
159. Id. § 1693o-2(c)(2) ("The term 'debit card' means as any card, or other payment
code or device, issued or approved for use through a payment card network to debit an asset
account ... whether authorization is based on signature, PIN, or other means.").
160. NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *76-77.
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Board to implement a Final Rule that would allow multiple networks for
each authentication method (i.e., both PIN and signature networks).16 1
The Amendment was enacted to combat increasing network fees that
were the result of exclusivity deals between networks and card
issuers,162 as well as, to stop the consolidation of market power, to
increase competition in the debit network market, and to increase
merchant choice.' 6 3 Senator Durbin stated on the Senate floor that the
purpose of the network non-exclusivity provision in the Amendment
was to enable each transaction, regardless of whether PIN or signature,
"to be run over at least two unaffiliated networks."' Considering both
the legislative history and Senator Durbin's explicit statement, the
Board did not carry out Congress's statutory intent in its rulemaking. 165
The Final Rule effectively barred these goals from being realized
because it enacted a regulation with which the majority of networks
were already in compliance with, thereby preserving the status quo. 166
As a result of this regulation, most banks' method of complying with
the Final Rule was to "enable more than one PIN network on their debit
cards, but not more than one signature network."1 67

161. 156 CONG. REc. S5926 (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin).
162. See 156 CONG. REc. S10996 (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin) ("In recent
years ... the biggest networks like Visa have begun requiring banks to sign exclusive
agreements under which they become the sole network on the banks' cards. This diminishes
competition between networks and leads to higher prices. My amendment will restore this
competition."); NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *81.
163. See 156 CONG. REc. S5926 (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin); Comment Letter
of Senator Richard J. Durbin to Federal Reserve Board, supra note 44, at 11.
164. 156 Cong. Rec. S5926 (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin) ("This [provision] is
intended to enable each and every electronic debit transaction-no matter whether the
transaction is authorized by a signature, PIN or otherwise- to be run over at least two
unaffiliated networks, and the Board's regulations should ensure that networks or issuers do
not try to evade the intent of this amendment by having cards that may run on only two
unaffiliated networks where one of those networks is limited and cannot be used for many
types of transactions.").
165. See NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *81.
166. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,447 (July
20, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235) (stating that many issuers are in compliance with
Alternative A (the "network proposal"), therefore choosing this option would minimize
compliance burdens and present less logistical burden).
167. Effects on Merchants, Consumers, and Payment System Efficiency, supra note 35,
at 98.
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The Durbin Amendment's PotentialEffect with CorrectBoard
Implementation

Had the Board crafted a Final Rule consistent with Congress's
statutory language and legislative history, it is possible that the
Amendment would have encouraged economic improvement. The
Amendment was enacted to increase competition in the market,168
which would lower interchange fees for merchants, particularly small
merchants.1 69 If the increase in competition did decrease fees, then the
reasonable and proportional interchange fee cap would have ensured
that the fees decreased. 170 The savings from these lower fees for small
merchants were supposed to be passed through to consumers, who
would in turn increase spending and inject capital into a struggling
market (as would the new success of smaller businesses who were no
longer crippled by these fees). 1 7 1 Subsequently, with more money in
the market, consumers would have more capital to deposit into banks,
which would help reduce any lost fee revenue that the banks might have
suffered as a result of the Amendment.1 72
All of the intended benefits were predicated on the
understanding that the reduction in prices for consumers would be
greater than any cost increase that banks may have passed through to
consumers because of lost interchange revenue.' 7 3 However this was
nearly impossible under the Final Rule because it merely cut the
interested parties' desires down the middle rather than following
Congress's intent. 174 Two years after the implementation of the Durbin
168. 156 CONG. REC. S10996 (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin); Comment Letter of
Senator Richard J. Durbin to Federal Reserve Board, supranote 44, at 11.
169. See discussionsupra Part III.A. 1-2.
170. A decrease in fees was surely to come, because the average interchange fee before
regulation was forty-four cents, and the proposed and Final Rule were each less than the
previous average. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,397.
171. See generally Durbin Statement on His Debit Card Swipe Fee Amendment, supra
note 70 (arguing the importance of helping small businesses grow as a means for economic
improvement).
172. See Sekar, supra note 66 ("If [the Board has] correctly judged the cap, banks will
not suffer a loss to their bottom line, and will continue to provide the same services to
consumers while merchants are able to offer better prices.").
173. See David S. Evans et al., The Impact of the U.S. Debit Card Interchange Fee
Regulation on Consumer Welfare: An Event Study Analysis 24 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law
and Econ., Working Paper No. 658) [hereinafter Impact of U.S. Regulation on Consumer
Welfare].
174. See Brief of Senator Richard J. Durbin as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs
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Amendment, few of its goals have been fulfilled and instead, many
negatives consequences have arisen.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE BOARD'S IMPROPER FINAL RULE

A.

The Effect on Big Banks and Exempt Banks

Under the Board's proposed rule, it was estimated that the
average big bank's debit interchange fee revenue would decline by 70 to
80%,175 and that the rule would cost the industry more than $6 billion
per year.176 After the Board's regulations became effective on October
1, 2011, sixteen of the top twenty interchange fee-earning banks lost
approximately $1.5 billion in interchange fee revenue in the fourth
quarter of 2011 alone.' 7 7 It is estimated that in 2012, the first full year
after the regulation went into effect, card issuing banks lost
approximately $7.3 billion in interchange fee revenue. 178 This decrease
in revenue is particularly harmful because interchange fee revenue
subsidizes many financial institutions' operating costs, such as the cost
of offering checking accounts and debit cards, producing cards, and
other non-lending products and services.179
Due to the new regulations, banks supplemented their bottom
lines by cutting costs, offering fewer complementary services, and
increasing customer fees.180 Before the Amendment, 76% of banks
offered free checking accounts, but by the end of 2012 that number had
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 152, at 24.
175. Christopher Leonard, Durbin Amendment Winners, Losers, AM. BANKER, Feb. 4,
2011.
176. Sekar, supra note 66.
177. See Halah Touryalai, Here Are The Banks That Lost The Most Under The Durbin
Amendment,
FORBEs
(Mar.
29,
2012,
4:52
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/03/29/here-are-the-banks-that-lost-themost-under-the-durbin-amendment/ (The author of this Note performed these calculations
using the data from SNL Financial based on the changes between Q3 'll and Q4 'll
interchange fee revenues.).
178. Impact of U.S. Regulation on Consumer Welfare, supra note 173, at 2.
179. John Buhrmaster, Losers in Debit Interchange Ruling: Consumers and the Free
Market, AM. BANKER, Aug. 16, 2013.
180. Leonard, supra note 175 (Banks are "no longer giving refunds for use of other
banks' ATMs, and stopping many services previously included for free on some accounts
like free checks, safe deposit box rentals."); Impact of U.S. Regulation on Consumer
Welfare, supra note 173, at 47-48 (explaining that most banks pass on about 70% of lost
revenue on to consumers, making the pass-through rate of lost revenue higher in the banking
sector than in others).
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fallen to 39%. '8' Additionally, some big banks have either increased
the average minimum balance required to avoid maintenance fees or
have stopped waiving fees for any account, regardless of the amount
held within it. 182 Many big banks have completely dropped debit
reward programs to customers and have begun charging for previously
complementary services, such as free checks or safety deposit box
rentals. 83 Moreover, many banks had to increase customer fees,
including maintenance, overdraft, ATM, and annual fees.' 84
Initially, many big banks proposed new monthly fees for debit
card transactions to cover lost interchange revenue.' 8 5 For example,
Bank of America and Wells Fargo proposed charging a five dollar and
three dollar monthly debit card fee, respectively, but these plans
triggered immediate customer backlash and neither bank implemented
these fees.1 86 Because these monthly debit card transaction fees failed,
some banks had to increase fees on other services, as previously noted,
which likely went unnoticed by many customers. 87 This creates a
problem for many customers, particularly those with low incomes, who
are frequently driven away from banks because of burdensome hidden
or unexpected fees, and must then turn to cash or alternative financial
outlets like check-cashing and bill-paying services. 8 8 It is now harder

181. Claes Bell, Checking fees rise to record highs in 2012, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 24,
2012), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/checking-fees-record-highs-in-2012.aspx
(stating that free checking accounts fell 6% from 2011 to 2012.).
182. Id. (declaring that the average minimum balance required to avoid fees rose 23%
from 2011); see also Oxman, supra note 32.
183. See Leonard, supranote 175; Oxman, supra note 32.
184. See Bell, supra note 181 (noting that the average monthly maintenance fee for noninterest checking accounts increased 25% from 2011 to $5.48, overdraft fees have reached a
record high of $31.26, and out-of-network ATM fees increased 11% from 2011).
185. See Robin Sidel, Big Banks Blink on New Card Fees, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 100014240529702045050304577002041853240850.html
(stating that J.P. Morgan, U.S. Bancorp, Citigroup, PNC, and KeyCorp also suggested these
monthly fees on debit transactions but also abandoned that idea); Linette Lopez, After
Dropping Debit Card Fees, Bank of America is Quietly Cranking up Fees Elsewhere,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 14, 2011, 9:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/new-fees-

banks-are-charing-customers-bank-of-america-debt-card-2011- 11.
186. Dakin Campbell, Wells Fargo Cancels Pilot Program of $3 Monthly Debit-Card
Fee, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-28/wellsfargo-cancels-pilot-program-of-3-debit-card-fee-as-customers-react.html; see also Balto,
supra note 99 (discussing the backlash Bank of America faced when they proposed a $5
debit card fee).
187. See Lopez, supra note 185.
188. See Ann Carrns, Fees Help Drive Working Poor From Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27,
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for these lower-income customers to maintain accounts because of
increased fees that are meant to cover lost interchange fee revenue.189
The backlash from these banks' proposals for monthly debit
card transaction fees helped spark support for a grassroots campaign,
Bank Transfer Day, which aimed to get people to shift their money out
of big banks on November 5, 2011.190 On that day, approximately
600,000 U.S. customers moved their money from big banks to
community banks or credit unions. 191 Although this number pales in
comparison to the number of checking accounts in the industry, it is
meaningful.1 92 It takes a great deal of effort for consumers to switch
banks, and for so many to do so on a single day shows a deep public
resentment towards these fees. 193
While many exempt banks, which are primarily community
banks and credit unions, feared that the Amendment would
inadvertently hurt them-because card networks would not be able to
set separate interchange fees for regulated and exempt banks-the
regulation has actually been to their benefit because nearly all networks
have been able to adopt a two-tier fee structure. 194 According to the
Kansas City Federal Reserve, exempt banks have barely seen a decrease

2011, 3:22 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/fees-drive-working-poor-frombanking-system/.
189. See IAN LEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 16 ("[T]he number of unbanked households
rose from approximately 9 million (7.7% of all households) in 2009 to about 10 million
(8.8% of all households) in 2010.").
190. Mitch Lipka, PersonalFinance:Bank Transfer Day saw 600,000 switch, REUTERS
(Jan.
27,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/27/us-bank-transferidUSTRE80Q1TU20120127.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. See id. ("Consumers have strong ties to their banks because of direct deposit,
automated bill payments and habit-making change more complex than simply going
someplace else.").
194. See Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 90 ("Many of the
smaller, exempt banks had feared that networks, forced by the regulations to lower their
interchange fees for the larger, regulated banks, would choose to lower their interchange
fees for exempt banks also. However, nearly all debit card networks have set separate
interchange fees for regulated banks and exempt banks, creating a two-tier fee structure after
the regulations took effect."); Letter from Sen. Richard J. Durbin, Assistant Majority
Leader, to Linda Koch, President and CEO of Ill. Bankers Ass'n, Dan Plauda, President and
CEO of Ill. Credit Union League, and Robert Wingert, President of Cmty. Bankers Ass'n of
Ill.
(Oct.
4,
2011),
available
at
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfin/statementscommentary?ID=a6dbbebe-laf0427a-abbf-5f3f5 1d5292b.
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in interchange fee revenue.' 9 5 Exempt banks saw a decrease from fortyfive to forty-three cents while those at big banks plummeted from fifty
to twenty-four cents. 196 To highlight how the Amendment affects
exempt banks differently, Boeing Employees Credit Union (BECU),
which recently became subject to the Amendment's regulations due to
its assets increasing to over $10 billion, estimates that lost interchange
revenue will cost the bank between $35 and $45 million in 2014.197 I
addition to a less drastic change in interchange revenue, these exempt
banks have also been able to attract more customers with free checking
accounts, lower fees, and new reward programs, which big banks are no
longer able to offer. 198
B.

The Effect on Consumers,Merchants, and Network Competition

Congress and the Board assumed that merchants would reduce
prices when interchange fees became regulated.1 99 However, this
assumption was baseless because none of the countries in the world that
have imposed price controls on interchange fees have experienced any
documented pass-through of savings to consumers. 200 In Australia,
where interchange fees have been regulated for almost a decade, there
195. Kevin Wack, Damage to Banks from Debit Card Ruling Goes Beyond Lower Fee
Cap, AM. BANKER, Aug. 14, 2013.
196. InitialEffects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 98-99 (providing the same
reduction values for exempt banks and separating regulated banks' decreases by PIN-based
and signature-based transactions); Wack, supra note 195.
197. David Morrison, BECU's Durbin Hit: $45 Million, CREDIT UNION TIMES (Oct. 2,
2013), http://www.cutimes.com/2013/10/02/becus-durbin-hit-45-million.
198. See Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 103 ("Community
banks and credit unions have reacted with a range of tactics. Some have offered monthly
rewards to prospective customers for opening a checking account. Others have offered cash
back for every debit card purchase made by customers during a specified period. Yet others
have publicized offers of free checking accounts, with no requirements and no debit card
fees."); Bell, supra note 181 (stating that 72% of the largest credit unions still offer free
checking accounts).
199. See Christine Edwards et al., Implementing the Durbin Amendment: What was the
Fed
thinking?,
WINSTON
&
STRAWN
LLP
(April
8,
2011),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-54df42 ld-fa3e-4a95-a6ba-f52737d0bb97.
200. James Kanter, European Union Advocates Limiting Fees on Debit and Credit Card
2013),
(July
24,
TIMEs
N.Y.
Transactions,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/business/global/european-union-aims-to-lower-creditcard-fees.html (quoting Todd J. Zywicki, professor at George Mason University School of
Law); see also IAN LEE ET Al., supra note 23, at 14-19 (providing a case study on the next
effects of interchange fee regulation in the United States and Australia, as evidence for the
claim that Canada should forego interchange fee regulation).
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has not been any documented evidence of a pass-through of savings to
retail consumers. 20 1 The United States's experience has been no
different: two years after implementation-Congress's assumptions
have proven to be wrong, with most consumers having received little to
no benefit at all.202
For the regulation to benefit consumers, savings to consumers
from a reduction in retail prices needed to be greater than the amount of
lost revenue that banks would pass through to consumers.2 03 However,
many merchants have not lowered prices and some have even raised
them: 81% of stores have raised prices in the past year and many have
raised them beyond the rate of inflation.2 04 Furthermore, any cost
savings to merchants because of regulation would likely be too
negligible to measure, especially when other merchant costs are
changing.205 Merchant prices are also relatively sticky, meaning that
prices typically do not reflect any cost reductions for at least one
206
It is estimated that consumers will lose "$22 to $25 billion
year.
more per year from higher bank fees and reduced services than they are
expected to gain from lower merchant prices and better merchant
services."2 0 7 Effectively, the initial result of the Amendment was to pad
retailers' bottom lines without incentivizing them to reduce prices.2 08
While there has been a lot of finger pointing in the industry as to who

201.

IAN LEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 18; see also Impact of U.S. Regulation on

Consumer Welfare, supra note 173, at 3-4 ("Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). . . claimed
that merchants in Australia passed most of the cost savings from reductions in credit card
interchange fees on to consumers. The RBA based that conclusion on two false premises:
that retailing in Australia is a competitive industry and that economic theory shows that
competitive industries pass on most or all of cost savings.").
202. See Press Release, Electronic Payments Coalition, Two Years Later, Consumers
Still Not Benefiting from Durbin Amendment (Oct. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Electronic
Payments Coalition Press Release], available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/two-yearslater-consumers-still-173700737.html (providing that since the Amendment consumers have
paid 4.3% more per purchase in stores where prices have increased).
203. Impact of U.S. Regulation on Consumer Welfare, supra note 173, at 24.
204. Electronic Payments Coalition Press Release, supra note 202.
205. See LIAN
LEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 16-17.
206. See Impact of U.S. Regulation on Consumer Welfare, supranote 173, at 22.
207. Impact of U.S. Regulation on Consumer Welfare, supra note 173, at 48. Id. at 23
("But [interchange fee regulation's] potential impact on consumer prices is quite smallless than 5 cents on an average transaction even if retailers passed through 100% of the cost
savings.").
208. Jeff Horwitz & Harry Terris, A Year On, Debate About the Durbin Effect
Continues, AM. BANKER, Oct. 1, 2012 (quoting Gil Luria, an analyst at Wedbush Morgan
Securities).
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has actually been reaping the rewards of reduced interchange fees, it is
certainly not the consumer.2 09
The Amendment has also failed to aid small merchants, the
other intended beneficiary of the provision. Before the Amendment,
card issuers gave merchants discounts on debit card fees for small
purchases. 210 However, card issuers eliminated this practice in response
to their lost interchange revenue, and now many small business owners
who sell low-priced goods are paying higher interchange fees. 21 1 For
example, Redbox (which rents DVDs from unmanned kiosks) was
forced to raise the price of a daily rental from $1.00 to $1.20 in response
to higher fees the charged as a result of interchange fee regulation.2 12
Instead, the Amendment has helped big-box retailers who, it has been
argued, merely used small merchants as a sympathetic mask and were
the real muscle behind the Amendment during the legislative process. 2 13
These big-box retailers, utility companies, hotels, and e-commerce
merchants have seen their competitive advantage magnified as the gap
between mega retailers and main street shops grows.2 14 If these large
merchants truly had the interests of their smaller competitors in mind,
they would have pushed for them to have equal bargaining power rather
than an interchange fee cap that padded their own bottom line. 215
The Amendment however did partially realize its objective of
209. See Martha C. White, Swipe Fee Caps are Here-So Where Are The Savings?,
TIME (May 7, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/05/07/swipe-fee-caps-are-here-sowhere-are-the-savings/.
210. See IAN LEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 17.
211. See Robin Sidel, Debit-Fee Cap Has Nasty Side Effect, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204319004577084613307585768.html;
Effects on Merchants, Consumers, and Payment System Efficiency, supra note 35, at 94.
Another explanation for small merchants not benefitting from the regulation is the structure
of the blended merchant discount that they are charged. As previously noted, smaller
merchants are typically charged a blended merchant discount. This form of merchant
discount does not immediately reflect cost savings because the acquirer will not reset the
blended fee to reflect new fee reductions until the acquirer can ascertain the distribution of a
given merchant's debit transactions between exempt and regulated banks. Id. at 97-98.
212. IAN LEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 17.
213. See Shay, supra note 66; IAN LEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 17 n.12 ("In a 2010 Q4
Home Depot Inc. Earnings Conference ... Home Depot CFO Carol Tom6 said, '[o]n the
Durbin side ... [b]ased on the Fed's draft regulations, we think the benefit to The Home
Depot could be $35 million a year."').
214. See Shay, supra note 66; LAN LEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 17; Effects on
Merchants, Consumers, and Payment System Efficiency, supra note 35, at 94 (stating that
utility companies, hotels, and e-merchants have realized the greatest savings from the
regulation because they had the highest interchange fees before regulation).
215. See Shay, supra note 66.
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increasing competition in the network market. Before the Board's
regulations, Visa's share of the combined signature and PIN debit
market was approximately 60%.216 After the regulations became
effective, Visa's combined PIN and signature card volume decreased
for the first time since 2006, and MasterCard's combined PIN and
signature card volume was higher in each of the first quarters of 2012
than in corresponding quarters of 201 1.217 While it is too early to know
how competition will shift among the player in the networks' market,
the nature of the competition in the market has changed.2 18
PIN network competition has increased because of the method
in which most card issuers complied with the network exclusivity
regulation-by providing multiple PIN networks but only one signature
network on their cards. 2 19 For example, Visa's PIN network, Interlink,
has lost significant market share to its competitors because many
merchants want to avoid Interlink.2 20 Because of the network nonexclusivity regulation it is quite likely that PIN transactions are now
more evenly distributed among networks, although the same has yet to
be reported for signature debit transactions. 22 '
VI. CONCLUSION

In the D.C. District Court's decision in NACS v. Board, Judge
Leon held that the Board must vacate its interchange fee and network
non-exclusivity regulations and develop new regulations that follow
Congressional intent.222 Although the Federal Reserve System has
appealed this decision under expedited review by the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals, the Board's interchange fee and network exclusivity rules
216. Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 82.
217. Id. at 103-04.
218. See id. at 106.
219. See Effects on Merchants, Consumers, and Payment System Efficiency, supra note
35, at 98; Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 105.
220. Effects on Merchants, Consumers, and Payment System Efficiency, supra note 35,
at 98 (listing Interlink's competitors as Maestro, Pulse, and Star).
221. See Initial Effects on Networks and Banks, supra note 26, at 105.
222. See NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., No. 11-02075 (RJL), 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *86 (D.D.C. July 31, 2013); Update on D.C. District Court's
Determination to Vacate Key Provisions of Regulation II, ALSTON & BIRD LLP (Aug. 14,
2013),
http://www.alston.com/Files/Publication/9e60f473-8314-4a82-a874643702clSfc6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f929b664-2f04-4606-b91965c97bl834f5/13-603-Update-on-DC-District-Court.pdf (explaining the progression of this
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will stay in place during the appeals process. 223 Some believe that it is
unlikely that the Court's decision will be overturned on appeal because
of Judge Leon's strict reading of the statute. 224
Many commentators and lawmakers have advocated for the
Amendment to be repealed.2 2 5 However, this is unlikely because the
Government Accountability Office has acknowledged the need for
interchange regulation 226 and since the Amendment was passed,
interchange regulation has continued as the trend in the rest of the
world. For example, on September 23, 2013, Visa and MasterCard
agreed to a deal with the French Competition Authority to cut their
interchange fees in the country by 44% and 49%, respectively. 227
Poland has also passed legislation to limit interchange fees to .5% of a
transaction's value.2 28 The events in France and Poland reflect the
widespread changes in Europe, as the European Commission also wants
to cap certain credit and debit card fees in order to stimulate the
sluggish economy. 229 Because interchange fee regulation has persisted
as the international norm (and due to the negative public sentiment that
would arise from a return to an unregulated market), it is very likely that
the Board will need to implement new regulations for both of these
provisions in the Amendment.2 3 0
223. See Tom Schoenberg and Sara Forden, Swipe-Fee Rules to Remain in PlaceDuring
Judge

Appeal,

Says,

BUSINESSWEEK

(Sept.

2013),

20,

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-09-20/swipe-fee-rules-to-remain-in-place-duringappeal-judge-says-1.
224. See Wack, supra note 195 (quoting New York University law Professor Richard
Epstein); Carolyn Vallejo, Durbin Debaters Take Sides in Washington, PYMNTS.COM (Nov.
8,
2013),
http://www.pymnts.com/briefing-room/consumer-engagement/RegulationRoundup/2013/durbin-debaters-take-sides-in-washington/ (Richard Epstein, a professor at
NYU Law, David Balto, a lawyer, and Bob Litan, the Director of Research at Bloomberg
Government each agree that the Board's chances on appeal are slim.).
225. See Halah Touryalai, New Bill Aims to Kill Durbin's Debit Card Fees, FORBES
(Oct. 13, 2011, 2:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalail2011/10/13/new-billcould-kill-durbins-debit-card-fees/; Eric Grover, Congress Should Repeal the Durbin
Amendment, AM. BANKER, Aug. 26, 2013.
226. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-45, RISING INTERCHANGE FEES
HAVE INCREASED COSTS FOR MERCHANTS, BUT OPTIONS FOR REDUCING FEES POSE
CHALLENGES (2009).

227. Barbara Casasus, French Agency Renders Decisions to Cut Interbank Fees on
Payments, BNA BANKING REPORT, Oct. 1, 2013.
228. Malgorzata Chrusciak & Ewelina Wagiel, Poland: Limit on interchangefees for

credit

and

debit

cards,

CMS

CAMERON

McKENNA,

Sept.

26,

2013,

http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1e5c3fd6-4226-42al-b969-e50f5ff941b8.
229. See Kanter, supra note 200.
230. But see J. Bradley Jansen, Stopping the Spread of Bad Ideas, HUFFINGTONPOST
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If Judge Leon's decision is upheld, the Board will likely have to
adopt a network non-exclusivity provision similar to its proposed
authentication method in order to be in line with the statutory
language. 2 3 1 Judge Leon's analysis regarding the statutory language for
this provision of the Amendment indicates that the only way for a
network non-exclusivity regulation to be upheld under the APA is for it
to allow multiple networks on each card for both PIN and signature
transaction. 232 Therefore, the Board's new network non-exclusivity
regulation would need to be substantially similar to its authentication
method proposal.
For the new interchange fee regulation, the Board could also
choose to adopt a regulation that is substantially similar to the proposed
rule, or formulate a new standard based on a percentage cap. If the
Board were to adopt a new interchange fee regulation that was much
lower and in line with the seven or twelve-cent caps that were initially
proposed, the new regulation could benefit consumers.233 Consumers
would benefit because merchants' savings from interchange fee
regulation would be large enough to pass savings through to
consumers. 234 Furthermore, big banks would likely not be able to
increase fees any more than they already have under the existing
regulation for fear that consumers would switch to exempt banks that do
not need to impose these costs and are able to offer more services.235
Therefore, under a new regulation that is similar to the Board's
proposed rule, consumers would benefit since the pass-through of
savings from merchants would likely be greater than the pass-through of
(Nov. 5, 2013, 3:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/j-bradley-jansen/stopping-thespread-of-bad-ideas_b 4213772.html (arguing that based on the failed experiences in
Australia and the United States, other countries should not implement interchange fee
regulation).
231. See NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 11-02075 (RJL),
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *73-86 (D.D.C. July 31, 2013) (Judge Richard J. Leon's
analysis of the improper regulation shows that in order to be in line with the statutory
language, the Board would need to adopt a regulation similar to Alternative B
("authentication method proposal")).
232. See NACS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107581, at *73-87.
233. See generally Impact of U.S. Regulation on Consumer Welfare, supra note 173, at
24 (providing the theory that consumer savings from retailers must be greater than the passthrough of losses from banks onto consumers in order for interchange fee regulation to be
beneficial).
234. See id.
235. See Bell, supra note 181 (stating that 72% of consumers would consider switching
banks if more fees were imposed).
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costs from banks.
Another option for the new regulation would be for the Board to
adopt a new interchange fee standard based on a percentage cap, as
opposed to the flat fee cap that it previously implemented. In its
rulemaking, the Board's staff explained that it chose a flat fee cap for
the Final Rule because it would incentivize issuers to reduce the costs
and administrative burdens of having merchants demonstrate categories
of costs associated with rates assessed.23 6 However, a percentage cap is
arguably more in line with the statutory language, because the statute
requires the Board to implement a standard for "reasonable and
proportionar'23 7 interchange fees. 238 Under a percentage cap, the
interchange fee charged would be proportional to the cost of the entire
transaction. A percentage cap would also be in line with what has
emerged as the international norm since the Amendment was passed.2 3 9
Furthermore, it would be consistent with a practice occasionally used
prior to the Amendment; debit interchange fees were sometimes a
percentage of the purchase price so that banks could make up for losses
on small transactions with higher fees on large purchases. 240 A
percentage cap could also help alleviate some of the negative
consequences that arose from the Final Rule, such as the
disproportionate effect of higher fees charged to merchants that sell
low-priced goods.2 4 1
236. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,737-38
(proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235); see also Edwards et al., supra note
199.
237. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 920, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis
added).
238. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,733 ("[I]n
considering whether an interchange fee is proportional to the issuer's costs, the Board does
not believe that proportionality must be interpreted to require identical cost-to-fee ratios for
all covered issuers."). The Board's construction of the term "proportional" for the
interchange fee regulation differed from the commonly accepted definition that the Board
previously used to create standards for proportional fees under the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1665d (2012).
239. See Chrusciak & Wagiel, supra note 228 (providing that Poland allows a maximum
of .5% of a transaction's value for interchange fees, while the European Commission is
considering .2% of the transaction's value for debit cards and .3% for debit cards).
240. See Epstein, supra note 47, at 59.
241. Networks would not need to eliminate the discounts for merchants that sell lowpriced goods, as they did after the implementation of the interchange fee regulation, because
the networks would be able to recoup any losses from these discounts with the proportional
interchange fee revenue from large purchases. See generally IAN LEE ET AL., supra note 23,
at 17.
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At this time, no one in the payment system industry is sure what
will happen on appeal or how the Board will construct its Final Rule if
Judge Leon's ruling is upheld. If the Board does not seriously
reconsider its Rule, the negative consequences to the banking industry
and consumers will only be amplified, and America will continue to be
increasingly dominated by big box retailers while main street businesses
will continue to disappear.
KATHLEEN

A. McCONNELL

